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CHAPTER 10 
Poland 
THE POLITICS OF "GOD'S PLAYGROUND" 
Jane Leftwich Curry 
Poland was the first and one of the most successful transitions from a centralized com-
munist state to a liberal, more Western-style democracy. During the European economic 
crisis, Poland's economy maintained one of the highest growth rates in the European 
Union (EU). Its political system stabilized. It has been both an active member of the EU 
and a strong advocate for liberalization of its eastern neighbors as well as for their inclu-
sion in European initiatives. Its prime minister, Donald Tusk, was the first East European 
elected head of the Council of Europe in 2014. His successor, Ewa Karpacz, signaled a 
shift to more social welfare programs aimed at the middle and lower classes. 
But getting there was not easy. Its early and fast start on democratization and eco-
nomic reform, as well as reformers' fear of opposition from the Soviet Union or even from 
the police and military in Poland, created complications that impact Polish politics even 
today. Since Poland was the first state to begin a transformation out of communism, its 
new leaders went only as far as they thought the Soviet Union and the rest of the bloc 
would tolerate. But within months, communism had collapsed everywhere except the 
Soviet Union, which was clearly too weak to hold back change. So the other former Soviet 
bloc states went much further much faster. As a result, the Polish political system was a 
"work in progress" for years, changing its constitution and laws in response to what did 
and did not work. In the process, Poland went from an uneasy coalition of former com-
munist leaders, Solidarity activists, and experts in 1989, to a system in which the right 
and then the former communists barded for power, and finally, by the end of its first two 
decades of democracy, to a stable system with two dominant parties close to the center 
and a number of smaller parties. 
Capitalism worked on a macroeconomic level from the start but brought with it dra-
matic losses for much of the country. A "shock therapy" economic program was imple-
mented in 1990 to stabilize the currency and allow prices to adjust to the marketplace so 
that a rapid shift to capitalism would be possible and Western aid would be approved. 
This process was the swiftest and most dramatic economic change in the region. But these 
reforms caused a dramatic drop in living standards for many. As a result, Poles were, for 
a long period, some of the least satisfied people in the former communist world, and Pol-
ish politics was often more about blaming and punishing the "bad guys" for economic 
235 
236 JANE LEFTWICH CURRY 
problems than about building party loyalty or popular trust in the new democratic insti-
tutions and leadership. 
When the European economic recession started in 2008, the Polish economy had 
been well enough reconstructed chat it was not affected by problems elsewhere in Europe 
and was the only economy in Europe co grow throughout the recession. Now, though, as 
the recession tapers off elsewhere in Europe, an increase in the national debt, unemploy-
ment, and continued inequality may weaken some of Poland's macroeconomic success. 
Poland came into the transition with a far more liberal political system than existed 
elsewhere. The three worker revolts before 1989 each ultimately resulted in concessions. 
Support for the Catholic Church was always strong enough to force rulers to concede to 
many of its demands and even seek its support. Solidarity, the trade union chat emerged 
out of the 1980 Gdansk workers strikes, had, at its height in 1981, over 10 million mem-
bers, easily the majority of Poland's workforce. Even after it was declared illegal and its 
leaders and activists were interned, it remained a force with which the regime ultimately 
had to negotiate. And the shortages and hardships of "real socialism" in Poland created 
friendship and professional groups chat helped people survive and counter the controls in 
the communist system. These groups, as well as the high level of social resistance, also al-
lowed alternative elites to establish themselves, provided the personal ties between groups 
that helped in the transition, and gave people organizing experience that facilitated Po-
land's negotiated transition. 
The weaknesses of the old communist system chat made it liberal also complicated 
the transition. Poland was, by 1989, over $40 billion in debt to the West 1 and still en-
meshed in the Soviet bloc economic system. This meant chat its options for economic 
reform were limited by its need to satisfy its Western debtors. Its opposition had been 
the strongest in the communist world well before Solidarity's 1980-1981 advent, but it 
also had ideological divisions, and many suspected that others were reporting on chem 
to the secret police. From the 1970s on, most Poles had real knowledge of and very 
high expectations for democracy and capitalism because they had been guest workers in 
the West, had ties co family members there, and had an elite that tried to buy chem off 
with its openness to the West. The image of democracy and capitalism they took away 
from chis was of prosperity not inequality. In Poland, they learned to work around or 
oppose the system. They did not learn, however, how to function as citizens in a normal 
democratic system. In the end, the communist-era reforms left chem with high hopes for 
democracy, little practice with working within a democracy, and an economy of foreign 
debt, inflation, and failed factories. 
The political ramifications of the communist past and the way the initial postcom-
munist leadership reformed the system and dealt with the past haunted Polish policies for 
almost two decades, even though Polish communism had been "communism light," with 
freedom for small businesses, peasants, and the Catholic Church and much more toler-
ance for dissent. The first prime minister in posccommunisc Poland, Tadeusz Mazow-
iecki, having entered into a unity government with the communists who handed over 
power, tried to "draw a thick line" to avoid divisions over the abuses of the past as Poland 
struggled to deal with the many challenges of starting a new system. Doing chis, though, 
left an opening for claims and counterclaims about what had happened and who had 
been responsible chat reached its height in 2006 when the hard-liners of the right-wing 
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Law and Justice Party (PiS) led by President Lech Kaczynski and his twin brother, Prime 
Minister Jaroslaw Kaczynski, labeled anyone who disagreed with chem a communist. In 
addition , the Mazowiecki government's choice of "shock therapy" to reform the economy 
by freeing the currency and prices while holding wages stable beneficed the economy in 
the long run but, in the short run, impoverished many and turned chem against the very 
reformers who had brought democracy co Poland. This further complicated political 
debates over options and popular faith in the new system. Substantive policy discussions 
often cook a back seat to battles over what had happened and who was responsible. 
Precommunist History 
Situated in the "heart of Europe" between Germany and Russia, Poland has a long his-
tory of struggle against outside conquerors. By 1795, the Polish-Lithuanian Common-
wealth had been split between the Russian, German, and Austrian empires. From then 
on, Poles fought at home and abroad for Polish independence. le cook World War I and 
Woodrow Wilson's commitment co "national self-determination" for Poland co get its 
independence back. Within the boundaries set by the post-World War I peace accord, 
Poland screeched from western cities, like Poznan, chat had long been part of Germany 
into the eastern areas with large Polish populations along with Ukrainians (Lw6w/Lviv) 
and Lithuanians (Vilnius/Wilno). 
In the interwar period, this made Poland a mulciethnic state: one-third of its popula-
tion was not ethnically Polish. This new state was burdened by having co establish na-
tional structures, deal with a diverse population of peoples with long histories of conflict, 
and build an economy and infrastructure out of parts of three empires, focused on Mos-
cow, Berlin, and Vienna, as opposed to Warsaw. Democracy and capitalism enjoyed brief 
success in the initial years of independence, only to be virtually washed out by the Great 
Depression. From their history, Poles learned co maintain their culture and national 
identity under foreign occupation. The Catholic Church became closely identified with 
Polish national identity. Ultimately, all these lessons served Poles well in their resistance 
co the German occupation of World War II and remained with them for the more than 
forty years of communist rule. 
Poland was devastated during World War II. In September 1939, it was first divided 
between the Soviets and Germans. Then, in 1941, the Germans turned on the Soviets 
and took over the rest of Poland. They used it as a base from which to annihilate Jews and 
Poles. Large numbers of Poles fought in a nationalist underground force against the Rus-
sians and Germans, while a far smaller group, identifying with communism, fought the 
Germans and the nationalist underground. Ultimately, one-third of Poland's population 
perished (including almost all of its Jewish population); its capital, Warsaw, was razed to 
the ground; and much of its industrial base and many of its ocher cities were destroyed. 
Ac the end of the war, the Soviet army cook control despite Poles' attempts to prevent a 
Soviet takeover. In the process, the factories and infrastructure chat survived were taken 
back co the Soviet Union co rebuild its own infrastructure. To add to the complications 
of rebuilding, in postwar agreements the boundaries of Poland were moved far to the west 
inco what had been Germany, and most of Poland's eastern territories were annexed by 
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the Soviet Union. With chis shift came a massive population transfer: most Germans in 
what became western Poland were forced out or went willingly co Germany. Many Poles 
and Ukrainians moved or were forced west to settle in the areas the Germans had vacated. 
Communist Experience 
Soviet troops brought a communise regime in as a "baggage-train government" when they 
marched across Poland and pushed the Germans out in 1945. That new leadership was an 
uneasy alliance between Polish communist officials who had spent the war in the Soviet 
Union and communists who had fought in the small pro-communist underground. These 
new rulers had to rebuild most of the country and, at the same time, impose unwelcome 
communist rule. The Communist Party took control of the government, established state 
ownership of Poland's economy, and tried to control and limit the Catholic Church. 
With chis came Stalinist terror, eased only by the communist leadership's rell\ctance to 
repeat Stalin's prewar destruction of the Polish Communist Party leadership by purging 
and killing chose leaders who had spent the war years in Poland (as was done elsewhere 
in Central and Eastern Europe). The top leaders were also restrained by the refusal of the 
Catholic Church and the predominately Catholic population to submit totally to the new 
regime. At the same time, there were chose who gained from the ongoing reconstruction 
and industrialization when large numbers of new industries were built and young peas-
ants moved to cities to work in factories. In the process a whole new working class was 
established and educated. 
With the deaths ofJoseph Stalin in 1953 and of Poland's Stalinist leader, Boleslaw 
Bierut, in March 1956, fear and control decreased. In the summer of 1956, Polish work-
ers demonstrated in the Western city of Poznan, demanding "bread and freedom" and 
calling out, "The press lies." Polish troops fired on the demonstrators, killing almost a 
hundred. Open intellecrual protests spread throughout Poland in the fall. Many Polish 
United Workers' Party (PUWP) members demanded reforms in the party itself. The party 
leadership tried to end chis "Polish October" by bringing back Wladyslaw Gomulka, a 
party leader jailed in the Stalinist period for his independence. When returned to power, 
he started "a Polish road to socialism," allowing private farming, small private enterprises, 
more freedoms for the Catholic Church, and greater freedom for public discussion. From 
then on, Poland remained on its own "freer" road. 
These events were the first in a series of revolts against communism's failings, includ-
ing student and intellectual demonstrations in 1968 and workers' riots in 1970, 1976, 
and 1980 triggered by price increases and economic failures. After each of the workers' 
demonstrations, the communist authorities made concessions to maintain their hold and 
buy support, only to fail to meet their promises. With each uprising, though, the oppo-
sition grew and became more organized until, after the 1976 workers' demonstrations, 
the Workers' Defense Committee (KOR) was formed to aid arrested workers and their 
families. It then produced underground publications to let people know about their rights 
and about human rights violations in Poland and co encourage independent chinking. By 
the lace 1970s and early 1980s, chis opposition had flowered into a massive underground 
press empire, a number of human rights organizations, and a whole alternate cultural 
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milieu, including a "Flying University" offering courses taught by instructors not permit-
ted in the communist curriculum.2 It was from this opposition, in combination with the 
shipyard workers who had demonstrated and lost in 1970, that Solidarity emerged and 
the men and women who would take Poland into its transition gained influence.3 
When Edward Gierek took over as head of the party after the December 1970 
Gdansk shipyard strikes, he promised Poles their lives would improve. To jump-start the 
economy and provide for a higher living standard, Poland borrowed from the West to 
build new factories with Western equipment and began importing Western consumer 
goods. These loans were to pay for themselves with earnings from the export of products 
to the West. However, the plan did not work: much of the money was wasted, Polish 
goods did not sell, and Poland had to borrow more and more just to pay the interest on 
its debts. By the beginning of the 1980s, the shelves of Polish stores were bare, and Poland 
was in the midst of a debt crisis with $8.1 billion-far more than its ready cash and assets 
would cover-of its over $20 billion debt to the West due in 1980. 
The government was so desperate to placate Western creditors without touching off 
demonstrations that it imposed price increases on food staples (under Western pressure), 
region by region, with instructions to local leaders to negotiate pay increases if there were 
strikes or demonstrations. By August, rolling price increases on food and consumer goods 
had been imposed across the country. 
The plan was that price increases would be imposed last in the seacoast towns where 
the 1970 riots had brought down the Gomulka regime. In response to the price increases, 
workers in the Gdansk shipyards went on strike and simply refused to negotiate pay 
increases. Under the leadership of dissident worker Lech Wal~sa, workers occupied the 
shipyards in Gdansk and other Baltic towns, demanding not just the economic and social 
welfare benefits communism had promised but also the right to have an independent 
trade union, the right to strike, and more media freedom so that they would know what 
was really going on. Intellectuals joined them. Workers from other places in Poland sent 
messages of support, and some joined in support strikes. The Polish government con-
ceded to the workers ' demands by signing the Gdansk Agreement. Solidarity became a 
national movement for economic and political change in Poland. 
Poles were further emboldened to stand up to their leaders by the election of Karol 
Wojryla, the former archbishop of Krakow, as pope in 1978 and his triumphant return 
to Poland in June 1979 as a conquering hero whose trip was organized and run by vol-
unteers rather than the government, even as he was feted by communist leaders and the 
population alike. The rise of Solidarity was dramatic. By the end of its first year, more 
than one-third of the population had joined the movement. A farmers' Solidarity and a 
students' union had formed and forced the government to recognize them. Workplaces 
organized. Many party members joined Solidarity and sought to bring its openness into 
the Polish United Workers' Party. Independent press and discussions appeared every-
where. Solidarity elections and a national congress were held. Popular demands on the 
government increased. Poland's economy simply could not work well enough to feed 
its population, much less provide the gains the Gdansk Agreements promised. As the 
economic situation worsened, strikes and demonstrations became the order of the day. 
What food supplies were available were rationed, or individuals had to use their connec-
tions to get meat and other necessities. The government could only make more and more 
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political concessions, even as the Soviet Union and other Soviet bloc states pressed for a 
crackdown. For Polish leaders and their allies, the potential for chaos and threat of con-
tagion were all too real. Party leader and head of the Polish military Wojciech Jaruzelski 
and those around him were convinced, by the end of 1981, that the Soviet Union would 
invade if popular actions and government concessions went any further. 
On December 13, 1981, martial law was declared, and the freedoms Solidarity had 
enjoyed for fifteen months ended with a Polish military "takeover." Solidarity and other 
independent groups were declared illegal and shut down. Thousands of Solidarity and 
intellectual activists, as well as some top PUWP leaders accused of corruption and mis-
management during the Gierek era, were interned. Polish soldiers and police were on the 
streets when people woke up. Military officers supervised factories, schools, media, and 
government offices for months. Media freedom and free discussion ended. Individual 
parishes and Catholic organizations provided havens for discussion and distributed food 
and clothing to the struggling population. Most Poles were too shocked to act. The 
United States and some other Western countries imposed sanctions on Poland. Martial 
law under Jaruzelski, as head of the Polish military and Communist Party, continued 
formally for a year and a half. 
Until the mid-1980s, the economic situation remained severely troubled. The sanc-
tions imposed by the United States and some other Western countries remained in place. 
Some activists continued to be interned, and Solidarity and the other independent or-
ganizations were illegal, but an active underground movement functioned, and dissident 
publications and activities proliferated. At the same time, the difficulties of daily life amid 
constant shortages meant that most individuals focused on feeding and supplying their 
families rather than engaging in open political protest. 
Transition from Communism 
By the late eighties, Poland's economy had failed to rebound and provide what Poles 
thought they had been promised. The communists' efforts to win support or even draw 
in respected activists and intellectuals largely failed. Much of Poland's population was 
alienated from both Solidarity and the communist government. Random strikes with no 
specific goals worried both Solidarity leaders and the communists. To deal with this alien-
ation, communist leaders reached out to the opposition as they tried to get the economy 
moving by decreasing controls on prices and forcing factories to be self-supporting. When 
none of these maneuvers worked, the government, with the support of the Catholic 
Church, sought Solidarity leaders' agreement to begin discussions on systemic change. 
Church leaders helped bring the two sides together and agreed to facilitate Roundtable 
talks between them. 
No one thought communism would end. For the rulers, the Roundtables were a way 
to hold on to power by getting Solidarity to share responsibility for Poland's problems 
and move toward a new, more open system of government over the next four years. For 
Solidarity's self-appointed representatives, the most important goal of the Roundtables 
was to force the relegalization of Solidarity as a trade union (something the government 
conceded on the first day of the public Roundtables). The population hoped that the 
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Roundtable agreements would protect the economic guarantees of a social welfare state 
and that the freedoms of the Solidarity era would be returned. The Catholic Church 
wanted the Roundtables to stabilize Poland and ensure its interests and position. 
After five months of private discussions and nine weeks of public discussions, the 
two sides agreed to defer decisions on economic reforms and move ahead with political 
reforms and parliamentary elections designed to give the PUWP and its former allies a 
majority of seats in a parliament that included Solidarity and other nonparty people as 
"junior partners." In the process, they created a system that broke taboos but did not 
initially violate the Soviet Union's old limits. 
The Polish political system was redesigned to have a second legislative chamber 
(the Senate) and a president elected by the two houses together. To ensure the domi-
nance of the communists and the two subsidiary parties that had run with it in the 
communist era, in this transitional election, 65 percent of the seats in the traditional 
parliament (Sejm) were designated for candidates who had been in one of these parties, 
and 35 percent of the seats were designated for candidates who had not belonged to a 
party in the communist era. The candidates of Solidarity and other opposition groups 
could run for the latter. Finally, forty seats were reserved for the so-called National 
List of the regime's notables and reformers. The new Senate, as a trade-off, was elected 
without any constraints. A majoritarian election system, in which those who did not get 
a majority in the first round had to run against the next-closest candidate in a second 
election, was used for both "party" and nonparty seats in the Sejm and new Senate as 
well as for the National List. 
The results of the elections on June 4, 1989, defied all expectations. Candidates Soli-
darity identified as theirs (signaled by posters showing the candidate with Lech Wal~sa) 
won every nonparty seat in the Sejm and all but one in the Senate. Only a few of the 
Communist Party candidates, on the other hand, got the requisite majority to win in the 
first round. Most of the "party" seats had to be decided in the second round. All but the 
two men whose names were at the bottom of the National List lost in the first round, 
and few ran again in the second.4 The presidency (elected by the Sejm and Senate) went, 
as had been tacitly promised, to Jaruzelski, the man who had both called for the hated 
martial law and championed the Roundtable talks. His victory was the result of a politi-
cal compromise Solidarity leaders engineered to placate Communist Party and military 
hard-liners in Poland and hard-line leaders elsewhere in the Soviet bloc. 
The 65 percent majority established for the Communist Party and its old allies did 
not hold. The smaller parties, long Trojan horses to draw peasants and small entrepre-
neurs into the system, broke with the PUWP and joined Solidarity. That reversed the 
percentages for the "establishment" and the "opposition" in the Sejm: people elected as 
PUWP members now held 35 percent of the seats, and 65 percent of the seats were held 
by Solidarity and its new allies from the old system. 
The Soviet leaders accepted the results. But no one knew what would happen next. 
Solidarity deputies' platform had been against communism, bur they had no actual plans 
for instituting real change in Poland. Communist deputies, on the other hand, were not 
prepared to be in the minority. They had expected to share power with nonparty mem-
bers. They too had no plan for what would happen next. And their tries at forming a 
coalition government with Solidarity and their old allies failed. 
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A new, noncommunist government was formed in September 1989. Tadeusz 
Mazowiecki (longtime Catholic editor, dissident, and advisor to Solidarity leader Lech 
Wal~sa) was named prime minister on Wal~sa's recommendation. He formed a unity 
government of dissident intellectuals, experts in economics, specialists from the parties 
formerly aligned with the Communist Party, and three communist ministers to manage 
the most important ministries for Soviet interests: the Ministry oflnterior (police and spy 
services), the Ministry of Defense, and the Ministry of Foreign Trade. Western-educated 
economist Leszek Balcerowicz was named minister of finance and deputy prime minister 
to manage economic reform. 
The new government confronted the task of "unmaking communist control" and 
agreeing on concrete policies for the transition. What had been the Solidarity monolith 
against the communists dissolved into many factions. Faced with minority party mem-
bership after forty years of party rule, Communist Party deputies wanted as little to do 
with the rejected system as possible. By January 1990, the Communist Party, PUWP, 
had dissolved itself and passed its resources on to the new Social Democratic Party of the 
Polish Republic (SLDRP). 
Solidarity and Communist deputies all worked to cut-and-paste the communist con-
stitution to fit the election results and the Roundtable Accords. They excised from the 
constitution provisions like the "leading role of the party" and the promise of fealty to 
the Soviet Union. All national symbols dropped their communist elements. Then, under 
pressure from the United States and Western Europe, the Sejm passed bills instituting 
"shock therapy" economic reform (the Balcerowicz Plan) to make rapid privatization, for-
eign aid, and investment possible. This program-coupled with the inflation that began 
after the last communist government freed most food prices so they skyrocketed with the 
reforms (while salaries remained stable)-triggered a drop in the purchasing power of the 
zloty by 40 percent at the end of the plan's first month Qanuary 1990) and brought a 
rapid end to popular euphoria over communism's end and Poland's "return to Europe." 
For most Poles, their economic losses and gains were far more important public 
policy issues than Poland's foreign policy, dealing with the communist past, or imposing 
Catholic values by adding religion to the school curriculum and prohibiting abortion. 
Public opinion shows that, although Poles believed in democracy, their faith in the way 
the political system was run, its politicians, and its economic and political policies took 
a sharp dip after 1990 and declined over the years, only to begin to stabilize and even 
improve after 2007, when the economy stabilized and centrist parties dominated. Popular 
participation in elections has most often been under 60 percent-even during the eupho-
ria of the first partially free elections and then communism's collapse. Respect for and 
involvement in the Catholic Church, once the symbol of the nation, has dropped steadily. 
There is also evidence of some popular nostalgia for the communist days and a decrease 
in faith in elected institutions and the Catholic Church. 5 
Political Institutions 
For most of its postcommunist history, governance and political battles in Poland were 
more about which institution (president, prime minister and Council of Ministers, Sejm, 
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Photo 7 0. 7. Solidarity poster that covered the streets of Poland 
the morning of the June 7 989 elections, based on a Gary Cooper 
poster for the film High Noon. 
Senate, or courts) could do what. Initially, the "Small Constitution" of 1992 codified the 
additions and deletions made in 1990 to take communism out of the constitution and 
defined the powers of the major institutions. This did not, however, provide a framework 
to set out, coordinate, and balance what institutions could and could not do. So, in the 
first years, elected officials established the rights and responsibilities of their offices either, 
if they were legislators, by passing more legislation or, if they were the president or prime 
minister, by simply claiming the right to act and setting precedents. Only in 1997 was a 
full constitution passed. 
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Poland's constitutional system began as a strong semi-presidential one in which the 
president had the right to veto legislation or refer it to the constitutional court for review, 
disband parliament and call new elections, declare a state of emergency, play a role in se-
lecting the prime minister and cabinet, appoint some top judges and officials to some su-
pervisory councils, and represent the country in international politics and military affairs. 
Wojciech Jaruzelski, as Poland's first president and a remnant of the defeated regime, 
used virtually none of these powers unless asked to do so by the Solidarity government. 
After Lech Wali:sa, the former leader of Solidarity, became president, he took control by 
ignoring limits on his powers. In response, the 1992 and 1997 constitutions reined in 
the powers of the presidency and increased the powers of the prime minister and cabinet. 
Under the 1997 constitution, the president has the right to step in and name a prime 
minister only if the Sejm is too divided to agree. The prime minister and his cabinet can 
be removed only by a vote of no confidence by the parliament. The prime minister is 
responsible for selecting his cabinet and presenting his choices to the Sejm for approval. 
The government also has the explicit responsibility to lead the policy-making process in 
domestic and foreign affairs, carry out the laws passed by the parliament, put forth regula-
tions as authorized by the Sejm, and manage the state budget. Finally, the president and 
prime minister must cosign all laws. 
The powers of legislation are concentrated in the Sejm. It also has the right to ap-
point officials to various public boards and to specific seats on the court. The Senate, on 
the ocher hand, is primarily a body to review and revise Sejm legislation and serve as a 
moderator in conflicts. 
So, although the presidency formally retains most of its powers, each is now coun-
terbalanced by the power of the legislature or the prime minister. Until 2005, even in 
the one period when the president and the government were from the same parry-the 
Democratic Left Alliance (SLD)-these rules held. In 2005, the Law and Justice Parry 
dominated the parliament, and its leader, Lech Kaczynski, was elected president. There 
were conflicts between the president and prime minister. These ended when Kaczynski 
appointed, as prime minister, his identical twin brother, Jaroslaw, who then lost the post 
after the 2007 early elections. Subsequently, Lech Kaczynski used his veto to block legisla-
tion by the Civic Platform (PO) majority and ignored constitutional limits by intervening 
in policy decisions in both domestic and foreign policy. 
As is clear, the powers of the presidency, the prime minister, and the parliament have 
often stemmed from the policies and personalities of the moment rather than from con-
stitutional provisions. Poland's first four presidents cut very different profiles. The first 
three claimed to represent not a political party but the Polish people as a whole. What 
they tried to do depended on their own interests and sense of power. Jaruzelski avoided 
conflict with the new Solidarity government and served as a figurehead. Lech Wati:sa 
rode in as the leader of the Solidarity movement and attempted an "imperial presidency." 
Although much of what he claimed he could do never happened, his threats alarmed 
many. Two years into his rule, he faced a very divided parliament. There were deadlocks 
with the government, public opposition to and disgust with his style of leadership, and 
even claims among former supporters that he had been a secret agent. All of these weak-
ened not only his popular support but also his ability to lead. After he disbanded the 
parliament, following a vote of no confidence in the government in 1993, and an early 
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Photo l 0.2. Lech Wal~sa (president of Poland from 1991 to 1995), Tadeusz Mazowiecki 
(prime minister from 1989 to 1991 ), and Aleksander Kwasniewski (president from 1995 
to 2005). (Rzeczpospolita) 
parliamentary election, he found himself trapped in a continuous conflict with the SLD's 
majoriry and its prime minister and cabinet. In the end, no matter what Wai~sa did, he 
was checkmated by the parliamentary majority. 
Aleksander Kwasniewski, who was elected president in 1995 and again in 2000, 
differed greacly from his predecessors. Given the public attacks on his party (SLD) and 
on him for having communist connections, he focused on disproving stereotypes about 
communists. He was a "by-the-book" president, taking no more power than was consti-
tutionally mandated. At the same time, he was able to work effectively behind the scenes. 
In his first term, he had an SLD and Peasant Party parliamentary majority, so legislation 
was passed and conflicts avoided. As a result, in 1997, a full constitution was passed with 
support from all sides. After the 1997 parliamentary election, he worked with the right-
wing coalition by focusing on avoiding direct conflict and presenting himself as a profes-
sional. He became the representative of Poland to the world, with a special emphasis on 
the West and leading Poland into the North Aclantic Treaty Organization (NATO). In 
the process, he returned prestige and the faith of the public to the presidency. 
In 2000, Kwasniewski was so strong that other parties fielded candidates with little 
hope of winning. His slogan, "Poland: A Home for All," emphasized his apolitical lead-
ership. One year later, the SLD returned as the dominant party balanced against a frag-
mented right wing. By default, Poland moved back to a semi-presidential state, with the 
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president appointing economist Marek Belka as prime minister and taking leadership in 
areas like foreign policy that were the constitutional purview of the presidency. 
In 2005, Lech Kaczynski of the Law and Justice Party was elected president, and 
parliamentary elections resulted in his party being the largest in the Sejm, so it could 
form a government with two very different but small radical parties (Samoobrona, or Self-
Defense, and the League of Polish Families). He and his twin brother, Jaroslaw, in the 
role of prime minister, appointed allies to ministerial posts. There was no credible means 
to rein in his actions or his party and its fractious coalition. Changes in the electoral laws 
for local governments and leaders' commitment to "cleansing" the system of "agents" 
from the communist period enabled the Kaczynski brothers to expand their powers by 
claiming individuals who disagreed with them had been communists or agents. They then 
changed the lustration process, making all the old secret police files public and allowing 
the removal of individuals from public office based on the contents of their files. This 
Photo l 0 .3. The late president Lech Kaczynski congratula-
ting his twin brother, Jaroslaw Kaczynski. on his swearing in 
as prime minister in 2006. He left office in November 2007. 
( Rzeczpospolita) 
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made opposition to the government risky. At the same time, the Law and Justice Party 
and its allies engaged in continual internal battles over charges and countercharges. 
Early parliamentary elections, held on October 24, 2007, showed popular disaffec-
tion with attacks regarding the past. A movement spearheaded by young people to get 
out the vote brought the more policy-focused Civic Platform to power. When the Civic 
Platform won parliamentary elections in 2007, that party's centrist leader, Donald Tusk, 
became prime minister. He worked to modernize the bureaucracy so that the govern-
ment was more responsive. He and his coalition reversed what the rightest coalition had 
done by moving back to closer relations with Germany. Tusk's positive and professional 
style of leadership, as well as Poland's economic health during the recession, made him a 
popular leader. In the process, though, he faced constant attacks and vetoes of legislation 
by Kaczynski. 
Lech Kaczynski essentially wielded right-wing power through his presidential veto 
powers and public attacks on his enemies as "communists." When Lech Kaczynski began 
his campaign for a second term as president in 2010, public opinion polls showed that 
he was not popular enough to win. He escalated the rhetoric in his battle for power with 
Tusk. In foreign policy, he battled with the prime minister were over who could speak 
for Poland. After Prime Minister Tusk's participation in the official Russian-Polish com-
memoration of the slaughter of Polish officers by Soviet soldiers at the start of World 
War II, Kaczynski, as president, led his own delegation of political leaders and survivors 
to the site in Russia. The plane carrying them crashed in Smolensk, killing all aboard and 
beginning a political battle between Polish authorities and his twin brother, the head of 
Photo l 0.4. Donald Tusk, head of the Civic Platform, with supporters when they won 
the parliamentary election in 201 l and had a majority in parliament. (Adam Lach) 
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the Law and Justice Party, over whether the accident was the result of was pilot error, bad 
landing conditions, or a Russian attack. 
Despite the tragedy and the battles over what happened and how to memorialize Lech 
Kaczynski, his brother, Jaroslaw, Law and Justice's candidate for president in the special 
election in 2010, lost to the Civic Platform's candidate, Bronislaw Komorowski, whose 
campaign focused on the promise of civility and compromise in governance rather than 
conflict. With Komorowski's election to the presidency in 2010, the Civic Platform has 
controlled both parliament and the presidency. The circle was, in some sense, closed since 
Komorowski had maintained close ties to the leaders of the postcommunist government 
ofTadeusz Mazowiecki. Although there have been tax increases and demonstrations over 
the low incomes of professionals in health care and education as well as mini-scandals, 
the Civic Platform remained popular and cohesive under Donald Tusk. It will, though, 
face Law and Justice again in the presidential and parliamentary elections in 2015, with 
its top leader, Tusk, serving not as prime minister but as head of the Council of Europe. 
Parties and Elections 
After 1989, holding elections became politicians' way of solving political conflicts and 
battles over institutional powers. In the process, rather than clear policy divisions, elec-
tions came to reflect the individual battles of increasingly radicalized political leaders. As 
a result, until the mid-2000s, elections actually increased fragmentation, parties came and 
went, and the public was often disenchanted with its elected officials. 
In the first decade after the fall of communism, parties on the right fought with 
each other and attacked other parties as "communist." The clearest divide, among voters 
and parties, was between those who saw the communist system in a positive light and 
those who identified with the Catholic Church. This divide was more significant than 
economic interests in determining how people voted.6 By 2007, though, the parties (and 
their leaders) on the far right and those connected with communists had destroyed them-
selves, leaving two major parties, the moderate Civic Platform and the populist Law and 
Justice, to do battle. 
In the first year after the end of communism, a rush to elections began in the sum-
mer of 1990. Local government elections were held before the duties and new powers of 
the various levels of local government had been established. Almost at the same time, a 
campaign by Lech Walc.sa and his followers got underway to force Jaruzelski's resignation 
and the passage of a law for direct popular election of the president. Jaruzelski conceded 
to this pressure and resigned. 
Lech Walc.sa won the first popular presidential election, defeating then Prime Min-
ister Tadeusz Mazowiecki and, more narrowly, defeating Stanislaw Tyminski, an emigre 
with no clear platform or qualifications who promised instant wealth for everyone. This 
election, in the fall of 1990, caused more fragmentation of Solidarity. 
Voting for someone new who promised dramatic improvement in living conditions 
and, on the right, condemned all opponents became the pattern in Poland's first decade 
and a half of democratic elections. Two other long-term features of party affiliation in 
Poland also began at this point. One was the regional difference in party support between 
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the prosperous west, with its big cities, which supported pro-reform candidates, and the 
impoverished east and other areas where factories had gone bankrupt and small-scale 
agriculture had failed, which supported the right with its promises of social welfare and 
condemnations of those who had made the changes initially. The other feature that 
emerged was the focus of right-wing parties and voters on accounting for the communist 
past as a way of explaining and dealing with current economic problems. 
Initially, a plethora of tiny parties emerged, making coalitions difficult if not im-
possible after the initial free elections. In the early parliamentary elections of 1991, 
one hundred parries ran candidates, and twenty-nine parties were elected in the Sejm's 
proportional representation elections. The Senate was also fragmented after its elections. 
In addition to two warring Solidarity-based parries and the Solidarity trade union, there 
were various small right-wing parries that condemned both the former communists and 
Solidarity deputies for the losses "caused by" the Balcerowicz Plan, in a campaign marked 
by nationalist and religious rhetoric. Only the former communists, the Social Democratic 
Party of the Polish Republic, remained unified. 
So divided was this parliament that, within two years, it was unable to make policy 
and turned in on itself. In the process, the largest of the many parries in the Sejm pushed 
through two laws that impacted party politics. First, to cut down on the fragmentation of 
rhe Sejm, political parties were required to win 5 percent of the national vote and coali-
tions 7 percent to hold seats in the Sejm. Second, the Sejm legalized a system allowing 
parties represented in parliament to receive national government funding for their cam-
paigns if they had won at least 3 percent in the election. The amount of this funding was 
proportional to the number of seats a party won in the Sejm or Senate. 
In 1993, this electoral law resulted in the SLD, with only 20.41 percent of the votes, 
and its former allies, the renamed Polish Peasant Party, with 15.4 percent of the vote, 
winning 60.5 percent of Sejm seats. The nine right-wing parties that ran could not form 
a coalition, and none reached the 5 percent of the vote required to hold seats in parlia-
ment, so they got no seats even though, together, they polled 34.45 percent of the vote. 
Polish parries, with the exception of parties from the old communist system, have 
had neither the incentive nor the resources to do ground-level organization and build an 
infrastructure. After the era of Communist Party rule, the very word "party" and the no-
tion of being a party member had negative connotations, so most of the groups that ran 
for elections eschewed the word "party" and did not build structures or enroll members. 
Candidates, even from the most established parties, have had to invest their own money 
in campaigns; only if they win seats in parliament are they reimbursed. The expenses of 
being in parliament are paid through their party directly from the parliament's budget. 
This financing is complicated by defections from parliamentary parties while the parlia-
ment is in session. 
This funding has not resulted in political parties with permanent structures. Only 
the former communists (SLD) invested in the infrastructures typical of European parties. 
It starred ahead because it had inherited some of the PUWP's buildings, equipment, and 
membership lists, as well as old members who had long organized for the party. These 
cadres of old party workers were willing to work for the SLD, even though it voiced a 
pro-capitalist ideology, because the other parries attacked or shunned anyone who had 
been in the Communist Party. Then, after the 2001 elections, when the collapse of the 
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right-wing coalition handed victory to the SLD, the party destroyed itself by trying to 
expand its leadership, bringing in new people, and allowing them to profit from their 
positions in the party. 
The other political groups in Poland initially did not have the resources or desire to 
invest in increasingly expensive infrastructure and offices. In the early years of Poland's 
democracy, some right-wing parties received support and facilities from the Catholic 
Church in exchange for advocating for its interests. But in the years between elections, 
even the more successful parties remained essentially "couch parties," focused on indi-
vidual leaders and existing only during political campaigns. Most still have no real formal 
membership; leaders and parliamentary deputies only hold together because they get 
funding, beyond their salaries, from their party in parliament, not as individuals. Even 
the dominant party since 2007, Civic Platform, has not built a strong party organization. 
It has basically functioned as a Western catchall party focused on its strong and popular 
leadership. 
Parties' ideologies have been unstable and confusing at best. The dramatic defeat 
of the Communist Party in 1989 resulted in the dissolution of the Polish Communist 
Party (PUWP). Its legacy party, the Democratic Left Alliance (SLD), cast off its Marxist 
ideology and voted for the Balcerowicz Plan, then shifted to advocating for "trickle-down 
economics," holding that the poor would gain from excess profits in a capitalist economy. 
This position was amplified by the victory of SLD leader Aleksander Kwasniewski in the 
presidential race in 1995 and again in 2000. He essentially ran as a modern, pro-capital-
ist, European leader who was above the political fray. The SLD, once it won the 2001 
parliamentary election, became known for corruption at its lower levels and, as a result, 
lost its popular support. And Kwasniewski's attempt to save the left by linking those from 
the old Solidarity who stood for workers' rights and social democracy-who had never 
gotten an electoral foothold-and the SLD together in a group called Left and Democrats 
in the 2007 elections failed. Little remains of the left except for small groups of young 
politicians who began in the SLD who advocate for what are marginal issues in Poland. 
The initial political center (Freedom Union) could not disassociate itself from the 
losses people had suffered due to the Balcerowicz Plan. As a result, its candidates were 
defeated in the 1990 presidential election and the 1991 parliamentary elections and 
returned to government as an element of the Civic Platform. This center stands against 
Polish nationalism and for establishing a liberal market economy, democratization, and 
a return to Europe. Although some of its leaders were lay Catholic opposition leaders 
during the communist era, this center has not supported giving the Catholic Church real 
power in politics. 
In 2001, the center reemerged with 12.7 percent of the vote as the Civic Platform 
and came in second to the Democratic Left Alliance with its 41.0 percent. In 2007 and 
2011 the Civic Platform won the parliamentary as well as the presidential elections in 
2010. It maintains a pro-European and pro-free market position and supports a strong 
Polish presence in the European Union. Equally important is its reputation for rational 
and reasoned political action rather than politics marked by strong rhetoric, charges, and 
countercharges, seen as a negative characteristic of the right. 
The right wing has focused and focuses on Poles' bitterness over their losses in the 
initial move to capitalism. It has advocated for social welfare and protecting workers even 
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as it has railed against communist-era repression, the profits communists made by using 
their positions to buy up valuable properties during the transition, and communists' sup-
posed connections to Russia and the old secret police. Most right-wing parties, including 
the League of Polish Families, Solidarity Electoral Action, and Law and Justice, also, 
implicitly or explicitly, support Catholic religious values and Church authority as the 
core of public policy. In identifying themselves as Polish nationalists, they have opposed 
Poland's deep involvement with both the West and the governments of the former Soviet 
states. As such, they did not fully support joining the European Union and wanted to 
insure that Poland had a strong position even vis-a-vis Germany in spite of Germany's 
greater population. 
The most powerful and long-standing of these parties, Law and Justice, led with 
calls against corruption by government officials and "the elite" and with promises to end 
inequality and to punish communists and their agents and to exclude them from power. 
Since their defeat in 2007 in early parliamentary elections after their 2005 coalition with 
the centrist PO fell apart, they have continued to focus on this mix of attacks and dem-
onstrations of Polish nationalism. 
None of these parties on the right or their small successors today ever claimed to have 
had a clear, viable plan to solve the problems they identified. With the exception of those 
closely tied to the church, they have run "against" elements of the status quo-ranging 
from women's rights to "Europeanization"-rather than for any specific policy. Although 
many campaigned promising social benefits, most are parties of outspoken politicians 
rather than ideologically based organizations. As a result their coalitions have fallen apart 
every time they have taken the lead in parliament. 
The other stable party in the political constellation has been the Polish Peasant Party. 
It has never failed to hold seats in the Sejm and Senate even as it has lost support since 
1993. It has been in coalitions with both sides. Initially, it focused on the interests of the 
agricultural sector; more recently, it has positioned itself as a moderate party supporting 
both economic development and a preservation of social supports. In the 2005 election 
it did lose some of its peasant supporters to the radical Self-Defense Party; in 2007, how-
ever, it regained voter support as a party not involved in the ideological fights and also as 
the one major party that did not support the war in Iraq. 
In the long run, these fluid and irresolvable noneconomic divisions have meant that 
the battles in Polish politics have been more over issues of the past and religion than over 
how best to deal with the economy and the needs of people for state support services. 
As a result, without alternative policies on soluble problems, political rhetoric has often 
focused on charges and countercharges. In the end, the rationality and professionalism of 
the SDP under Aleksander Kwasniewski and the Civic Union's image allowed them to 
win sequential elections. 
Civil Society 
Unlike the rest of the postcommunist world, Poland began with well-established al-
ternative institutions from the communist period, including the Catholic Church, the 
intellectual opposition, and Solidarity. Intellectual opposition groups had clear leaders 
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known to the public, produced elaborate and regular sets of publications, ran an alterna-
tive educational system, and provided legal and financial support for individuals working 
in the opposition or workers punished for participation in demonstrations. Professional 
associations also acted more independently than their equivalents elsewhere in the Soviet 
bloc as they pressed for privileges and power for their groups. At the same time, in the 
communist period, Poles were part of elaborate friendship networks that often crossed 
lines between the regime and the opposition. These facilitated the negotiations that made 
the transition possible. 
Tragically, these institutions rapidly lost out in the transition. The informal networks 
were no longer necessary. Professional groups did not work in a system where there was 
competition for jobs within professions. And while established opposition groups and 
Solidarity retained their symbolism, they lost popular support when they had to be for 
something (particularly economic reform) rather than simply against communism. Their 
authority was also tarnished by allegations and some revelations that some prominent 
figures had been, at some time, agents of the secret police. 
Solidarity, the trade union formed as a result of shipyard workers' requirement for 
ending their strike in 1980, was a powerful, if decentralized, organization until martial 
law was imposed to end its activities in December 1981. Initially, strikes and other work 
actions (or the threat of them) brought concessions from the government. Solidarity also 
spun off unions of students and peasants. After it was declared illegal and a broad swath 
of its leadership was interned, it remained a powerful force as a symbol and rallying point 
for broad popular opposition. When the government sought a partner for negotiations 
in 1988 and 1989, it turned to Solidarity's former leaders, who generally sent their intel-
lectual advisors as negotiators to the Roundtables. Solidarity, under the guise of the Citi-
zens' Electoral Committees, then organized a massive campaign for the 1989 elections, 
signifying the candidates it supported in every district by papering the streets on election 
day with posters showing them with Solidarity leader Lech Wal~sa. 
After the formation of a Solidarity-based government and the passage of the Bal-
cerowicz Plan, Solidarity lost public support. Its old unity against communism's failures 
fragmented rapidly when policy had to be made. First, there were splits between the 
intellectuals who had advised Solidarity and those who had come to leadership from the 
working class over who should lead and what policy should be. Its dual role as trade union 
fighting for workers' rights and reformist political parry dissuaded supporters. 
More recently, organizations identifying themselves as Solidarity have appeared but 
have not had the draw or power that Solidarity did in 1980 and 1981 and then in 1989 
and 1990. Solidarity has not been able to focus on the interests of workers in private busi-
nesses and industries (now the vast majority of Polish workers).7 As inflation ate away at 
their salaries, public-sector employees, such as teachers and medical personnel, marched 
under the Solidarity banner against changes in benefits, bur they were never able to gather 
enough demonstrators to gain real traction. 
The Catholic Church was once such a popular force that the communises allowed it to 
function as a religious institution and symbol of the limits of communist rule. In the com-
munist period, going to church became not just a religious obligation bur also a political 
act for many. Catholic intellectuals and students groups, the Catholic University of Lublin, 
and a number of theological schools also helped link the church to the secular dissident 
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movement. In the 1980s, its role was magnified by the election of Karol Wojtyla, the former 
archbishop of Krakow, as the first non-Italian pope in four hundred years. The pope's first 
trip to Poland served as proof that people could organize without the state. This was critical 
in the mobilization of Solidarity a year later. The church served as a symbol for Solidarity 
and a haven that provided donated food and clothing for the needy during martial law 
From the first semi-free elections on, local churches and the national hierarchy 
inserted themselves directly into politics, supporting individual candidates and parties. 
The Catholic Church and the parties they supported pushed through and won required 
religious education in all schools and, eventually, strict limits on abortion. In the process, 
the church went from Poland's most respected institution to one of its least respected. 
Although Poland remains one of the most Catholic countries in Europe (88 percent 
identify as Catholic, although only 58 percent claim to be practicing8), the number of 
births out of wedlock and the number of abortions continue to increase. So, while Polish 
politicians were and are wary of going against the Church's wishes, much of the public 
sees the church as having too much influence in politics and so ignores its directives.9 At 
the same time, Catholic institutions have fragmented. The right-wing, privately owned 
Radio Maryja, with its xenophobia, racism, and anti-Semitism, became so powerful and 
popular that the Church hierarchy had no way to moderate it or stop it. 
As the economic transition reduced the free time and resources of most people, other 
civil society institutions failed to fill the void left by the reduced influence of intellectual 
and professional groups, the Catholic Church, and Solidarity. Initially, Western founda-
tions created or funded civil society organizations in Poland. Most of these lasted only 
as long as the funding from the outside did. Other organizations appeared. Some were 
charities for needy groups, but most focused on providing special benefits and privileges 
for their members or substituting for poor state services. They have not been significant 
political actors or avenues for popular participation in politics. 
The Economic Transformation 
The economy was the Achilles' heel of Poland's leaders in the communist period and 
during the transition. But, in the years that have followed, Poland's economy has become 
one of the stronger in the postcommunist world. In fact, Poland had the highest growth 
rate of any EU country during the European recession that began in 2008. 
In 1989, the economic reformers inherited an economy distorted by the communists' 
attempts to avert disaster with piecemeal reforms and their efforts to placate the popula-
tion by importing Western goods and allowing some privatization. So, reformers faced 
a population with higher expectations than elsewhere and a crushing debt to the West. 
Wes tern countries also had more power over Poland's economic decisions than they 
did in the rest of the communist world because Poland was so heavily indebted to the West. 
After all, Poland's attempt to jump-start its economy in the early 1970s by borrowing from 
the West had failed, pinning it under more than $43 billion of debt by 1989 (making it, 
then, the third most internationally indebted country in the world). This meant that Poles' 
decisions about how they transformed their economy were very much dependent on the 
approval of their Western creditors because they needed debt write-offs as well as aid. 
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Postcommunist economic reform began with "shock therapy," or the Balcerowicz 
Plan to curb high inflation and open the Polish market to competition with the outside. 
This reform involved ending all price controls January 1, 1990, a month after the bill was 
passed. This made the Polish zloty convertible to Western currencies, eliminating trade 
barriers and government subsidies for state enterprises so that they would be self-support-
ing, restricting wage increases, reducing the money supply, and increasing interest rates. 
Its results were disastrous for most individuals. By the end of January 1990, individual 
purchasing power had dropped 43.2 percent. Registered unemployment went from 0.3 
percent in December 1989 to 6.5 percent a year later, jumping to 11.4 percent in Decem-
ber 1991 and 16.4 percent in 1993. 10 Declines in all the major economic indicators for 
the next two years were equally dramatic. Gross domestic product (GDP) dropped over 
18 percent. In the first month of 1990 alone, industrial production dropped 30 percent, 
and the purchasing power of wages and salaries went down more than one-third. Peas-
ant incomes fell by about half. Polish agricultural goods lost out to better-packaged and 
heavily subsidized Western goods that were often cheaper than their now unsubsidized 
Polish equivalents. Old state cooperatives and private enterprises that had survived the 
communist era collapsed because they could not compete with mass-produced Western 
goods or pay soaring costs for rent, materials, and salaries. At the same time, a small group 
of wealthy "owners and consultants" emerged. Poles reacted by voting government after 
government out. By 1993, the economy had begun an upswing that lasted through the 
mid-1990s, when it slowed perceptibly. Growth hovered around 5 percent per year in 
the mid- l 990s. 
Even as the economy grew, however, there were problems. The growth was happen-
ing only in specific areas where new technology brought productivity increases and job 
losses. The export sector lagged behind, leaving Poland with a serious deficit. Inflation 
remained high. For a large percentage of Poles, the new buildings and foreign investments 
in the major cities were coupled with bankruptcies in the smaller cities and rural regions. 
These triggered significant regional unemployment outside the major cities in what was 
known as "second Poland" and a slide into poverty for a majority of the population, even 
as a small but ever increasing number of people gained from the changes. This socioeco-
nomic division remains today. 
The solution for the government was to push privatization. New small firms, largely 
based on imports and street trade, blossomed. They often began by working around the 
existing rules, selling on the street and paying little or no tax. Many state stores were sim-
ply privatized by their employees. As a result, the share of employment and the national 
income in the private secror grew from less than one-third to more than half of the Pol-
ish economy by 1993, even though larger and weaker state firms continued on, virtually 
untouched by privatization. 
The next step proved extremely complex and contentious. Solidarity leaders ad-
vocated moving toward employee ownership and maintaining cooperative enterprises. 
Leszek Balcerowicz, as deputy prime minister and minister of finance, and his supporters 
wanted simply to privatize state industries as quickly and completely as possible by estab-
lishing a stock market and letting weak industries go bankrupt. Only after eleven draft 
laws were rejected did this Margaret Thatcher-style privatization become law. 
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In the end, Poland's privatization was piecemeal, done largely through foreign invest-
ment and mass privatization, where salable firms were consolidated into national invest-
ment funds. In this process, only 512 of the 8,453 state firms were included, most of 
them small. As a result, initially only about 2 percent of the total workforce was involved. 
Much of the money earmarked to prepare firms for privatization went to managers rather 
than to upgrading and reorganizing the firms. Every adult Pole got a share certificate for 
180 zlorys (about $40) to invest in these funds. For most Poles, this minimal "mass priva-
tization" was far from enticing. Rather than enlivening the market, the process caused 
the worth of the firms and the certificates to fall to less than half their original value. 11 
Most foreign direct investment involved government and private firms buying up 
state firms and Wes tern businesses moving in to renovate them or open new businesses. 
The bulk of new investments were in construction and the opening of huge supermarkets 
and discount stores. In the end, the Polish economy, 75 percent of which was in private 
hands by 2000, was a "subsidiary economy" of foreign firms. At the turn of the century, 
after these initial investments, foreign investment decreased dramatically: between 2000 
and 2002, the total direct foreign investment dropped from $9 .341 billion to $4.131 
billion. 12 
There were serious political complications in both mass privatization and foreign 
direct investment. For most Poles, privatization seemed to hurt rather than help. Newly 
privatized firms were often sold or transformed to make money for their managements. 
Wages and work conditions in many foreign firms have been below Polish standards. 
Many Poles felt Poland was being sold off, at bargain prices, to the West. Almost 75 
percent of banking services are controlled by Western capital, and large pares of other key 
institutions, such as the media, some postal services, and telephone services, are owned by 
outside interests. The public's disgust at not getting the benefits it expected from capital-
ism was magnified by accusations and revelations of corruption involved in selling off, 
with huge tax and price breaks, Polish industries and resources to Western firms and, in 
early 2000, Russian interests. 
The growth in Poland's GDP during the European recession was in large part a re-
sult of the funding benefits the European Union gave to prepare Poland's economy and 
infrastructure for accession; the comparatively small amount of its GDP that comprised 
foreign trade (and the fact that most of that trade was in agricultural products rather than 
modern, large-scale manufacturing); the slowness of its banking sector to modernize and 
lower its standards for loans or loans in foreign currency; and the fact that it had not 
joined the Eurozone. This meant that the Polish economy had funding for investment 
projects and was not as affected by the economic problems of other states when the reces-
sion hit. Its agricultural sector, after opposing joining the EU, found itself actually ben-
efiting from Poland's membership. Not only did the EU provide substantial agricultural 
aid as Poland was joining, but Poland's small, traditional farms found a valuable niche as 
producers of organic foods. 
As Poland moves ahead, the one troubling economic factor is the level of its national 
debt (more than 50 percent of its GDP since 2009), even though it is far lower than in 
many econom ies in Europe. Efforts to reduce the debt by cutting state costs and ben-
efits have not been well received. And the pressure of unemployment on the economy 
256 JANE LEFTWICH CURRY 
has grown as the loss of jobs elsewhere in Europe has forced Poles who had left to work 
abroad to return, heightening unemployment, particularly among youth. 
Social Conditions 
For all of Poland's macroeconomic successes, those gains have not been matched by the 
growth of salaries and employment rates for most of the population. The unemployed 
population has grown, and the worth of most workers' earnings has dropped because 
of high inflation rates. To keep the state sector solvent, many (mostly larger) firms that 
could not easily be sold off were closed down or sold off at low prices. Because so much 
of Poland's industry had been concentrated in single-industry towns and regions, outside 
the major cities, there were areas of mass unemployment in what came to be known as 
"second Poland." That still remains a problem alleviated only by the out-migration of 
workers to other areas where there are jobs. 
Indeed, Poland now has one of the highest levels of inequality in the European 
Union: 17 percent of the population lived below the government-established social 
minimum (enough income to cover not only food and housing but also clothes, limited 
cultural events, and education) in 2005, and 26 percent of children lived in poverty. 13 By 
2013, unemployment hovered around 10.3 percent, down from 19.1 percent in 2004, 
with approximately 27.3 percent registered unemployment among youth, down from 39 
percent in 2004. Much of this is long-term unemployment. These decreases occurred, 
in large part, because the elderly population is decreasing; as of 2010, nearly 5 million 
people were on early retirement, unemployment, or social welfare. The cohort of young 
people entering the labor market was much smaller than it had been previously because, 
as of 2010, nearly 2 million were working abroad and others were attending universities. 
But by 2013, many young people going into the labor market, after working abroad or 
finishing their educations, found there were no jobs for them. 
The impact of these inequities and demographic changes has been aggravated by the 
economic reforms' negative effect on the very aspects of social welfare that were "givens" 
in the communist era-free education and health care and guaranteed pensions. Reform-
ing the welfare system has never been high on the government's agenda. That, coupled 
with EU pressures for a low budget deficit, made either reforming or supporting social 
services difficult at best. So, doctors and teachers experienced a steady decline in their 
salaries, financial support for hospitals, schools, and other social welfare institutions dried 
up, and the wealthier segment of the population now uses private hospitals, clinics, and 
schools. Many professionals shifted to the new private sector in education and health care, 
took on multiple jobs, or left the country. 
These trends were also aggravated by the heightened demand on and costs to the 
state for health care and education as well as unemployment assistance and pensions. The 
economic reforms increased the cost of basic necessities dramatically, even as privatiza-
tion and the commitment to an exchangeable currency and meeting EU requirements 
decreased the money the state could spend on such services. 
The results of these social demands and the inability of the state to meet them have 
resulted in a number of changes in society. Unemployment and family support funds are 
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most often so limited that no one can live above the biological minimum level on only 
unemployment benefits or the family subsidies regions give out. Most of the unemployed 
have drifted away into the gray economy of illegal trade and crime. Particularly in the 
rural areas and small towns, poverty has become a steady state. After 2000, youth unem-
ployment and the promise of work for those with the right training increased the demand 
for some form of higher education. This in turn resulted in the proliferation of private 
schools not only at the lower levels but also in higher education. A decade later, universi-
ties, even the more prestigious ones, are unable to fill their departments, and many of 
their graduates are left to survive on part-time jobs. 
State support in these areas has been limited at best. After 1989, Jacek Kuron, a 
longtime member of the opposition and the first noncommunist minister of social wel-
fare, fought for decent unemployment benefits and even set up his own soup kitchens 
as a model for private action to deal with problems for which there was no government 
money. Only after the 1997 election was there an attempt to create coherent public pro-
grams to reorganize the health-care and pension systems and their funding. But by 2005, 
neither the right-wing Solidarity Electoral Action government nor its social democratic 
successor had been able to implement effective reforms in these areas. Hospitals closed 
down for months at a time because of a lack of funds. In one case, the Constitutional 
Court declared a health-care reform law unconstitutional, leaving the health-care system 
to function with no legal structure for more than a year until a new law was passed in 
2004. The crisis in the public sector has decreased slightly with the passage of some 
health-care and education legislation, but it is far from over. Salaries for public-sector 
employees remain a major political issue, as does the extent to which cutbacks can be 
made in government programs to reduce Poland's debt. 
Transitional Justice 
Poland's negotiated revolution and the unwillingness of many of its leading dissidents, 
once they became leaders, to punish the men and women of the former regime, its secret 
police, and network of agents led to "drawing a thick line" between the past and present. 
This action deferred dealing with what had happened under communist rule until 1996, 
when the first lustration law was passed. In the void this delay caused, politicians on the 
right made accusations and claimed to have proof in what came to be called "wild lustra-
tion. " This forced politicians on the left to move to establish a legal process for dealing 
with the past, complicated as it was by the fact that the secret police files had remained 
in the hands of the police, vulnerable to being destroyed or tampered with, until 2007. 
The Institute of National Memory was opened after a more developed and broader law 
was passed. 
Transitional justice in Poland has officially focused on three processes: trying lead-
ers accused of ordering attacks on major demonstrations, lustrating politicians listed as 
agents in the past, and setting up programs for recognizing and getting information out 
on long-ignored moments in Polish history. Ironically, public opinion surveys show that 
these processes have not been of great interest to the population; they have, however, been 
significant in political battles. 
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Until 2007, individual politicians were "lustrated" (barred from public office for 
having served as agents of the secret police) only if they lied in the declaration required of 
each candidate and some state officials by claiming not to have been such an agent. These 
declarations were posted in election district polling stations but did not deter voters from 
supporting strong candidates even if they had lied about their pasts. If top government 
officials were found to have lied on their forms, they were given the choice of either va-
cating their positions or going through a trial in a special, closed court. In 2006, the Law 
and Justice Parry pushed through legislation expanding the requirement for lustration to 
the legal, media, and education professions, as well as to other state offices, and opening 
up the police files of those who had been spied on not just to the victims but to journal-
ists and scholars as well. That legislation, though, was largely eviscerated by the courts as 
against European rights standards. Even with the opening of files and lustration, however, 
charges of having been an agent of the secret police or the Soviet Union, as well as refer-
ences to the past, remain regular parts of political discourse. To the extent that they had 
credibility, these attacks not only muddied political battles but also the public image of 
the Church and the opposition movement, both prime targets for secret police pressure. 
And although most of the victims and perpetrators are now dead or elderly and there is 
little political support for the politics of attacks, the secret police and their agents remain 
a popular topic in Polish film, and "who did what" is of interest to younger generations 
as well. 
Pressure from the right also resulted in trials of Wojciech Jaruzelski and others 
around him for the killing of workers in 1970 (although Jaruzelski did not sign the order 
and was not in the area when the attacks happened) and for the imposition of martial 
law. The trial for the 1970 killings dragged on for years. In 2007, based on documents 
in the files taken over by the Institute of National Memory, a trial of Jaruzelski and his 
close associates over the declaration of martial law in 1980 began. Both trials drew little 
public interest and were ended because the defendants were too old and ill. Ultimately, 
they had no effect on public opinion: a significant part of the population saw martial law 
as "the lesser evil." 
The institute has also taken an active role in historical discussions of the communist 
period, publishing books, sponsoring meetings, and even producing games designed to 
remind people and teach youth about the problems of life in communist systems. At the 
same time, new museums and monuments are being opened on issues ignored in the 
communist era: the Warsaw Uprising at the end of the war, the history of Jews in Poland, 
and repression under the communists. 
Foreign Policy 
Poland's foreign policy has tried to bridge three worlds: the United States, Western Eu-
rope, and the former Soviet bloc. Given the strength of the Polish lobby and the size of 
the Polish economy and unpaid debt, US interests were early and powerful players, as 
were West European interests. 
For all the initial government's interest in returning to Europe, it was impossible to 
turn away from the Soviet Union totally. The Soviet responses were key to how the Poles 
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designed the limits of their transition. The Soviet Union and former Soviet states that 
border Poland (Ukraine, Belarus, and Russia) have been an established market for Polish 
goods. Russia was also the major source of energy resources for Poland. 
Former Soviet peoples' desire to go to the West or have their systems follow Poland's 
model proved to be a blessing. On the one hand, Poles first worried that there would be a 
mass exodus from these poorer states to the West, flooding Poland with refugees. Instead, 
they got a plethora of skilled laborers from Ukraine and other former Soviet states ready 
to work at low wages in Poland to cover their expenses in their home countries. On the 
other hand, foreign policy leaders came to value the idea of Poland as a bridge between 
East and West. In playing this out, Poland has been far more engaged than other coun-
tries in Central and Eastern Europe in working with countries to the east and advocating 
for their democratization. Aleksander Kwasniewski, as a former communist and president 
of Poland, was used by the Ukrainian government and the Our Ukraine candidates to 
lead top-level negotiations that ended the Orange Revolution. And then, once Russian 
engagement in Ukraine began in 2014, Polish politicians were leaders in NATO and the 
EU, pushing for strong stands against the repression and Russian actions. 
This balancing act was complicated as it was coupled with incentives, largely for 
those on the left, to legitimize themselves by being welcomed by US leaders, NATO, and 
the European Union. For all of Poland's former politicians, especially the former com-
munists, one key way to legitimize themselves and the economic reforms they advocated 
was to stress Western ties and the fact that reforms were required for Poland to rejoin 
Europe as a part of the transatlantic alliance. 
It fell to the right wing to emphasize Polish nationalism and the risks and costs of 
alignment. Those on the right were inclined to picture Poland as being sold off to West-
ern (and former Soviet) interests. Hence, the Euroskeptic candidates in European Parlia-
ment elections were, most often, from right-wing parties in Poland. 
The balancing act required was not easy; nor was responding to the demands of 
membership in the EU and NATO or to US demands. Although Poland was the central 
geographic corridor for NATO and the European Union's expansion eastward, it lagged 
in making the necessary reforms. It also did not always side with the Europeans in eco-
nomic and political matters. In fact, Poland was long called by some "America's Trojan 
horse." When faced with a choice between American and European producers, it leaned 
toward US products. At the same time, for Poles, the United States' refusal to lift its visa 
requirement, as it has for the other Central European countries, has been a serious issue, 
especially now that Poles have money and there is no longer any real incentive to work 
illegally in the United States. 
NATO membership was an important symbol of Poland's turn to the West. It was, 
for Poles, a guarantee that they were safe from their eastern neighbors, even though there 
was no commitment, until Russia's intervention in Ukraine, to protect Poland in the 
event of an attack. The costs of joining and retooling its military were partially cushioned 
by Western aid it had received earlier and aid targeted to smooth its movement into 
NATO. After Britain, Poland was one of the first European states to join the "coalition 
of the willing in Iraq," with a sizable contingent of troops that governments on both the 
right and left maintained, and one of the last to withdraw. In response to Russian actions 
in Ukraine, NATO agreed to station rapid response forces in Poland. 
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Poland's membership in the European Union was guaranteed by its geographic po-
sition. Even if it lagged in its preparations, it could not be ignored and could not have 
its membership delayed. Many in Poland and the West feared che results of Poland's 
inclusion in the European Union, even as they cheered chis visible end co the division of 
Europe. Many thought Poles would leave en masse co work in Western Europe. To calm 
fear of what came co be known as "the Polish plumber," provisions were enacted allowing 
many countries not co give Central and East Europeans, particularly Poles, work permits 
for long-term stays in most of Western Europe. Bue until the recession, the emigration of 
Poles co Great Britain and Ireland proved a boon for chose economies. 
In its east, Poland built (with West European money) one of the most heavily 
guarded borders in the world to keep emigrants from getting into "Europe" through 
Poland. And yet, Poland's neighbors from Ukraine and Belarus could enter with only a 
visa-given out for free at embassies and consulates . So, Poles have been able co maintain 
their temporary-worker labor force and co provide a haven in times of political repression 
in Belarus and Ukraine. This new border had unexpected side effects: it cue off or reduced 
the barter trade that had been "big business" for eastern Poland, where factories were so 
poorly developed and produced such low-qualiry goods chat they could only trade with 
the even poorer countries co the east. 
European Union subsidies and special provisions eased the major concerns about 
the domestic impact of entry into the EU, which also triggered fear that Germans would 
retake their prewar property in western Poland. The European Union responded co the 
latter concern by ruling that, for the first seven years after Poland joined the EU in 2004, 
foreigners could not purchase Polish land. 
Poles' limited enthusiasm for joining the European Union was clear in the initial vote 
for EU membership in May 2003, when 77 percent of chose who went co the polls voted yes 
for membership-less than in any ocher Central and East European state except the Czech 
Republic and Slovakia-after an active government campaign in favor. In the elections for 
the European Parliament in June 2004 (less than two months after May 1, 2004, when Po-
land officially joined the EU), only 20.4 percent voted, and of chose, 55 percent supported 
candidates from parties that were, at best, skeptical of the EU. In the 2009 EU elections, 
participation had risen slightly to 24.5 percent, and the Euroskeptic vote had decreased, 
with 44 percent of the Polish vote (and half the seats) going to Civic Platform candidates. 
As a result, Polish policy coward the European Union has been split. On the one 
hand, the social democratic government created membership in NATO and the EU as its 
great achievement. The Law and Justice government chat began in 2005 was Euroskepcic, 
painting itself as the defender of Polish interests and the traditional Catholic faith in the 
EU. With a majority of Poland's deputies hailing from the Euroskeptic right, Poland did 
not always go along with standard EU procedures. So Poland was a leader in the demand 
that the EU constitution define Europe as a Christian society. Poland has also worked co 
increase its power in the EU, going so far in 2007 as co nearly block an agreement on vote 
counting provisions for the new EU constitution. A last minute compromise delaying the 
new voting system until 2012 ultimately placated the Poles. 
The victory of the Civic Platform in 2007 resulted in a dramatic turn coward closer ties 
with Western Europe and the United States, despite the objections of President Kaczynski. 
Prime Minister Donald Tusk rapidly developed close ties with Angela Merkel of Germany 
and other West European leaders. His work with these leaders facilitated his election co the 
Council of Europe, giving him even greater influence in European policy coward Russia. 
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As it has moved westward in its foreign policy, Poland has also maintained strong 
ties to Russia and the former Soviet states. In the process, Polish governments have tried 
to ensure continued access to Russian energy resources and markets. The Polish economy 
has also benefited from the cheap laborers that have come west to Poland to work. Po-
land's delay in dealing with the past complicated policy debates with accusations about 
who did what in the past. Then, as the European recession began and politics grew more 
troubled elsewhere, Poland's was the only economy that had a constant growth rate; it 
returned to being a model for politics in the region and became a leader in Europe itself. 
Polish foreign policy has, explicitly and implicitly, advocated for democratization in the 
countries to its east. When Russia under Vladimir Putin became more authoritarian and 
popular upheavals took place in Georgia and Ukraine in 2003 and 2004, Poland's ability 
to maintain itself as a bridge between East and West declined. Indeed, particularly since 
Aleksander Kwasniewski helped broker the transition in Ukraine in 2004, Russian-Polish 
relations, along with Polish-Belarusian relations, have grown colder, with Russia circum-
venting Poland in building an oil pipeline from Russia to Germany. But the conflict 
never went so far as to threaten Polish supplies of Russian energy. 
In 2013, beginning with the Euromaidan, Poles were engaged. Then, when the 
agreement fell apart and Russia entered Crimea, Polish foreign minister Radoslaw Sikor-
ski took the lead in pressing NATO, the G7, and the European Union to take a strong 
stance against Russian aggression. In Poland, Poles watched the events closely and col-
lected clothes and money to help the Ukrainians. And Poland moved to provide financial 
support for Ukraine until International Monetary Fund and other monetary aid could be 
agreed on and delivered to Ukraine. 
Conclusion 
The grand irony of the Polish transition is chat Poland had veered the furthest from 
Soviet-style communism (with the exception of Slovenia) before the transition began, 
had the best-developed civil society, and was the first state to begin the transition. Of the 
former communist states that are new entrants to the EU, Poland is the largest country 
with the biggest economy. Yet its initial transition, while clearly oriented toward democ-
racy and capitalism, was one of the most troubled, with the public quite willing to vote 
out regime after regime; serious economic problems, even when it had the fastest-growing 
economy in the region; and real popular disaffection. In the end, the weakness of Poland's 
communist regime and the success of the former communists in returning to power as 
pro-democracy politicians not only opened the door for a negotiated transition bur also 
made the construction of a new polity difficult. At the same time, these "rebranded" 
politicians took the lead in tying Poland to the West. 
Poland entered the EU haunted by old problems. For many individuals, the pains of 
the economic transition and the gap between their expectations and reality delegitimized 
the new system. Its failure to provide for youth employment decreased young people's 
excitement about building a "new Poland." The original reformers and the communises 
who turned democrats lost credibility, leaving Poland's political system bereft of par-
ties that participated in the change or are supported because of their work on economic 
reform and Poland's new position as a part of NATO and the EU. At the same time, 
Poland 's delay in dealing with the past and the secret police files on agents, who came to 
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symbolize the evils of communism, made the past a political football to shut down op-
position and explain away economic failures. 
But with the recession in Europe, Poland's problems with reform worked to its 
advantage. Poland had been less successful, after the transition, in getting foreign invest-
ment, opening up lending, and borrowing to modernize its economy. That meant it had 
not taken the steps that backfired for other countries. Politically, the back-and-forth of 
Polish politics destroyed both the ideological left and right. It reduced people's expecta-
tions of politics and politicians. And it left Poland with only a center of less ideological 
parties and a population with few expectations of their government. 
As this plays out, there is a clear move by most of the public toward rational and civil 
rather than extremist political parties. The policies of Civic Platform candidates may not 
all be popular, but their sryle of governance is. The geographic divide remains, with the 
eastern territories being far more impoverished; however, people there are far less politi-
cally active. In the end, Poland's parties have moved to the center, and the radical rhetoric 
and leadership battles have largely given way to more rational policy debates. And because 
of both its geographic position and its commitment to bridging divides, Poland is a major 
player in Europe itself 
Study Questions 
1. Why was Poland's communism less repressive and more inclined to liberalization of 
the economy and some aspects of sociery than that of other states? How did this im-
pact the nature of the transition? 
2. Why was Poland's transition a fully negotiated one, and how did this impact the 
nature of the initial government and the making of its critical decisions? Why did its 
politics evolve, over nearly twenry-five years, into a centrist two-parry system? 
3. How was Poland's economic transition begun? What was the political effect? 
4. What are the structures of government and their powers in postcommunist Poland? 
How were they established formally and informally? 
5. What are the key political parties and civic sociery organizations in Poland, and why 
have they proved weak? 
6. How did Poland's initial economic transition happen? How has it worked for people 
in Poland? 
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